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Abstract
A significant aspect of the study of quantum strategies is the exploration of the game-
theoretic solution concept of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the quantization of a game.
Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash equilibria. A refinement on the set of
Pareto optimal outcomes is known as social optimality in which the sum of players’ payoffs are
maximized. This paper analyzes social optimality in a Bayesian game that uses the setting of
generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments for its physical implementation. We show
that for the quantum Bayesian game a direct connection appears between the violation of
Bell’s inequality and the social optimal outcome of the game and that it attains a superior
socially optimal outcome.
1 Introduction
The probabilistic approach to the area of quantum games [1–64] shows how quantum probabil-
ities can result in non-classical outcomes that defy intuition. Without referring directly to the
mathematical machinery of quantum mechanics, this approach shows how a game-theoretic set-
ting can benefit from quantum probabilities obtained from quantum mechanical experiments. As
classical probabilities, quantum probabilities are normalized but they also obey other constraints
that are dictated by the rules of quantum mechanics. Our earlier studies [58,59] have investigated
coevolution [65] in quantum games and also developing a probabilistic approach to quantum
games [24, 48, 50, 60]. The solution concept of the Nash equilibrium (NE) from non-cooperative
game theory [66–68] has been studied from the outset of the field of quantum game theory. Named
after John Nash, it consists of a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player is left
with the incentive to unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if the change in
strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than if she remained with her
current strategy.
For a physical system used in implementing a quantum game, one usually considers violation
of Bell’s inequality in relation to the outcome of the game as represented by the concept of a NE.
In almost all cases of interest within the area of quantum game theory, one notices that Bell’s
inequality violation may only be indirectly proportional to the NE (or equilibria) of the game.
The question then arises whether there exist other solution concepts for which the mentioned
connection becomes a direct proportionlity. In the present paper, it is shown that when one
considers a particular refinement of the NE concept, a direct connection can indeed be established
between Bell’s inequality and the outcome of the game as represented by that refinement.
Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash equilibria. An outcome of a game is Pareto
optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at least one
player strictly better off. That is, a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon without
disadvantaging at least one player. Quite often, a NE is not Pareto optimal implying that players’
payoffs can all be increased. For the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, it is well known that the NE is
not Pareto optimal.
A stronger refinement of the NE concept, which is even simpler to state, is known as social
optimality [69]. It is a choice of strategies, one by each player, which is a social welfare maximizer
as it maximizes the sum of the players’ payoffs. Of course, this definition is only appropriate to
the extent that it makes sense to add the payoffs of different players together. Maximizing the
sum of players’ payoff may not necessarlily lead to the satisfaction of all the participating players.
As the Pareto optimal outcome is a refinement on the set of NE, the outcomes that are socially
optimal must also be Pareto optimal. If such an outcome were not Pareto optimal, there would be
a different outcome in which all payoffs were at least as large, and one was larger. This would be
an outcome with a larger sum of payoffs. On the other hand, a Pareto optimal outcome need not
be socially optimal and a NE may not be socially optimal even though it can be Pareto optimal.
However, a socially optimal outcome is always Pareto optimal.
In an earlier work [60] we have studied the solution concept of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
using a probabilistic approach to quantum games [24, 48, 50, 60]. In the present paper, we study
how quantum probabilities can result in a different outcome for the solution concept of social
optimality in a Bayesian game. We notice that with this refinement of the NE concept, a direct
connection appears between violation of CHSH form of Bell’s inequality [70,77,78] and the social
optimal outcome of the Bayesian game.
2 Social optimality in a Bayesian game
The decision-makers in a strategic game are called players who are endowed with a set of actions.
In a Bayesian game [66–68] the players have incomplete information about the other players’
payoffs i.e. the payoffs are not common knowledge. Incomplete information means that at least
one player does not know someone else’s payoffs. Random values are assigned to the players that
take values of types for each player and probabilities are associated to those types. A player’s payoff
function is determined by his/her type and the probability associated with that type. Examples
include auctions in which bidders do not know each others’ valuations and bargaining processes in
which another player’s discout factor is unknown. The game of Battle of the Sexes [68] when one
does not know if the other prefers to be alone or go on a date provides a clearer exposition of a
social dilemma that can be analysed using the theory of Bayesian games. More formally [67,68], a
Bayesian game consists of players and states. Each player has a set of actions, a set of signals that
the player may receive, and a signal function that associates a signal with each state. Consider
the following Bayesian game
Table 1. A Bayesian game of incomplete information.
in which there are four states represented by four rectangular boxes. As can be noted, each state
is a complete description of one collection of the players’ relevant characteristics. Players do not
observe the state and instead receive signals that provide them information about the state. The
signal functions [68] map states into players’ types. For the game in Table 1, the players Alice
and Bob both have two types that we call type 1 and type 2.
As the Table 1 shows, for Alice of either type, Bob is found to be one of the two types with
probability 1
2
. Similarly, for Bob of either type, Alice is found to be one of her two types with the
probability 1
2
. The payoffs to Alice and Bob of each type is given in the Table 1. For instance,
from the Table 1. The payoff matrix describing the interaction between Alice of type 2 and Bob
of type 1 is given as
Alice of type 2
B
S
Bob of type 1
B S(
(1, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 1)
)
. (1)
The normal form representation of this Bayesian game is obtained in Table 2 below
Strategies for
Alice’s two types
Strategies for
Bob’s two types
(B,B) (B,S) (S,B) (S, S)
(B,B) (1, 1
2
), (1, 1
2
) (1
2
, 1), (1, 1
2
) (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
) (0, 1
2
), (0, 1
2
)
(B,S) (1, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1) (1
2
, 0), (1
2
, 0) (1
2
, 1), (1
2
, 1) (0, 1
2
), (1
2
, 0)
(S,B) (0, 1
2
), (1
2
, 0) (1
2
, 1), (1
2
, 1) (1
2
, 0), (1
2
, 0) (1, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1)
(S, S) (0, 1
2
), (0, 1
2
) (1
2
, 0), (0, 1
2
) (1
2
, 1), (1, 1
2
) (1, 1
2
), (1, 1
2
)
Table 2. A normal form representation of the Bayesian game of Table 1.
where, the entries in parentheses on left column are pure strategies for Alice’s two types, respec-
tively. Similarly, the entries in parentheses in the top row are pure strategies for Bob’s two types,
respectively. For the two pairs of payoff entries, the first pair is for Alice’s two types and the
second payoff pair is for Bob’s two types.
For instance, in Table 2 above consider the entry (1
2
, 1), (1
2
, 1) that corresponds when the
strategy of Alice’s two types is (S,B) and the strategy of Bob’s two types is (B,S). Here,
understandably, the first entry in the braces is the strategy of either player of type 1. Now we
refer to Table 1 and notice how Table 2 is obtained from Table 1. At the intersection of the two
rows representing the strategies of S, B, played by Alice’s first and second types, respectively,
and the two columns representing the strategies of S, B, played by Alice’s first and second types,
respectively, we find the following entries
Alice’s first type: S
Alice’s second type: B
Bob’s first type: B Bob’s second type: S
(0, 0) (1, 1)
(1, 1) (1, 1)
, (2)
from which the payoff to Alice’s first type is obtained as 1
2
(0)+ 1
2
(1) = 1
2
and the payoff to Alice’s
second type is obtained as 1
2
(1) + 1
2
(1) = 1. Similarly, the payoff to Bob’s first type is obtained
as 1
2
(0) + 1
2
(1) = 1
2
whereas the payoff to Bob’s second type is obtained as 1
2
(1) + 1
2
(1) = 1. The
other payoffs in Table 2 can similarly be obtained from Table 1.
2.1 Mixed-strategy version
Consider now the mixed-strategy version of this game in which the players’ probabilities of selecting
B from the pure strategies B & S are given by numbers p, q, p′, and q′ ∈ [0, 1] for Alice of type
1, Alice of type 2, Bob of type 1, and for Bob of type 2, respectively. The mixed-strategy payoffs
for Alice’s and Bob’s two types is then obtained from Table 1 as
ΠA1(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
(
p
1− p
)T (
1 0
0 1
)(
p′
1− p′
)
+ 1
2
(
p
1− p
)T (
1 0
0 1
)(
q′
1− q′
)
,
ΠA2(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
(
q
1− q
)T (
1 0
0 1
)(
p′
1− p′
)
+ 1
2
(
q
1− q
)T (
0 1
1 0
)(
q′
1− q′
)
,
ΠB1(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
(
p
1− p
)T (
1 0
0 1
)(
p′
1− p′
)
+ 1
2
(
q
1− q
)T (
1 0
0 1
)(
p′
1− p′
)
,
ΠB2(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
(
p
1− p
)T (
1 0
0 1
)(
q′
1− q′
)
+ 1
2
(
q
1− q
)T (
0 1
1 0
)(
q′
1− q′
)
,
(3)
where T is for transpose and the subscripts 1 and 2 under A and B refer to the respective player’s
type. Also, a semicolon is used to separate Alice’s and Bob’s strategic variables p, q and p′, q′,
respectively.
Referring to how p, q, p′, q′ are defined above, the strategies of the Alice’s two types are (B,B),
(B,S), (S,B), (S, S) and these can be written as (p, q) = (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), respectively.
Likewise, the strategies of Bob’s two types are (B,B), (B,S), (S,B), (S, S) and can be written as
(p′, q′) = (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0), respectively. Substituting these in the mixed-strategy payoffs
(3) the entries of the normal form representation of the game in Table 2 can then be obtained.
3 Social optimality in factorizable Bayesian game
In order to introduce quantum probabilities in this game, we note that mixed-strategy payoff
relations (3) can be written as
ΠA1(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
[(1)ǫ1 + (0)ǫ2 + (0)ǫ3 + (1)ǫ4] +
1
2
[(1)ǫ5 + (0)ǫ6 + (0)ǫ7 + (1)ǫ8] ,
ΠA2(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
[(1)ǫ9 + (0)ǫ10 + (0)ǫ11 + (1)ǫ12] +
1
2
[(0)ǫ13 + (1)ǫ14 + (1)ǫ15 + (0)ǫ16] ,
ΠB1(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
[(1)ǫ1 + (0)ǫ2 + (0)ǫ3 + (1)ǫ4] +
1
2
[(1)ǫ9 + (0)ǫ10 + (0)ǫ11 + (1)ǫ12] ,
ΠB2(p, q; p
′, q′) = 1
2
[(1)ǫ5 + (0)ǫ6 + (0)ǫ7 + (1)ǫ8] +
1
2
[(0)ǫ13 + (1)ǫ14 + (1)ǫ15 + (0)ǫ16] ,
(4)
where
pp′ = ǫ1, p(1− p′) = ǫ2, (1 − p)p′ = ǫ3, (1− p)(1 − p′) = ǫ4,
pq′ = ǫ5, p(1− q′) = ǫ6, (1− p)q′ = ǫ7, (1− p)(1− q′) = ǫ8,
qp′ = ǫ9, q(1− p′) = ǫ10, (1− q)p′ = ǫ11, (1− q)(1 − p′) = ǫ12,
qq′ = ǫ13, q(1 − q′) = ǫ14, (1− q)q′ = ǫ15, (1− q)(1 − q′) = ǫ16. (5)
The set of factorizable probabilities ǫi (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) satisfies the normalization constraint as
described below
4∑
i=1
ǫi = 1,
8∑
i=5
ǫi = 1,
12∑
i=9
ǫi = 1,
16∑
i=13
ǫi = 1. (6)
To find the Socially Optimal outcome of this game, we consider the sum of players’ payoffs and
find its maximum i.e.
Πsum(p, q; p
′, q′) = ΠA1(p, q; p
′, q′) + ΠA2(p, q; p
′, q′) + ΠB1(p, q; p
′, q′) + ΠB2(p, q; p
′, q′). (7)
From Eqs. (4,5) we can write
ΠA1(p, q; p
′, q′) = (p′ + q′)(p− 1
2
) + (1− p), ΠA2(q; p′, q′) = (p′ − q′)(q − 12 ) + 12 ,
ΠB1(p, q; p
′, q′) = (p+ q)(p′ − 1
2
) + (1− p′), ΠB2(p, q; q′) = (p− q)(q′ − 12 ) + 12 , (8)
whose sum can be expressed as
Πsum(p, q; p
′, q′) = 2q′(p− q) + 2p′(p+ q − 1
2
)− 2p+ 3. (9)
Now, an edge solution refers to the end or edge values of the continuous variables p, q, p′, q′ within
their allowed intervals that are [0, 1] for each. A ‘non-edge’ solution, however, is the quadruple
(p∗, q∗; p′∗, q′∗) that maximizes the sum Πsum(p, q; p
′, q′). We thus require
∂Πsum
∂p
∣∣∣∣
∗
= 0,
∂Πsum
∂q
∣∣∣∣
∗
= 0,
∂Πsum
∂p′
∣∣∣∣
∗
= 0,
∂Πsum
∂q′
∣∣∣∣
∗
= 0, (10)
where, for instance, ∂Πsum
∂p
∣∣∣
∗
states that this expression is evaluated at p = p∗, q = q∗, p′ = p′∗,
q′ = q′∗. We obtain
p∗ = q∗ = 1
2
, p′∗ = q′∗ = 1
4
, (11)
at which the sum of the payoffs becomes
Πsum(p
∗, q∗; p′∗, q′∗) = 5
2
. (12)
As can be noticed, the ‘edge values’ of the function Πsum(p, q; p
′, q′) can nevertheless achieve higher
values than 5
2
. For instance, for (p, q; p′, q′) = (0, 0; 0, 0) we have Πsum(p
∗, q∗; p′∗, q′∗) = 3 and for
(p, q; p′, q′) = (1, 1; 1, 1) we have Πsum(p
∗, q∗; p′∗, q′∗) = 4.
4 Social optimality in the Bayesian game with quantum
probabilities
The above analysis of mixed-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria is for the case when the underlying
probabilities are factorizable. We now enquire whether there exists a different outcome of this
Bayesian game when underlying probabilities are not subjected to the constraints of factorizability
as described by Eqs. (5). For this we consider a set of quantum probabilities that are obtained from
the generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiments as such probabilities can become
non-factorizable.
The setting of the generalized EPR experiments [70–79] involves preparation of a maximally
entangled quantum state of pairs of photons. In each run, two halves of an EPR pair originating
from the same source travel in the opposite directions. One half of EPR pair is received by the
observer Alice whereas the other half is received by Bob. Players Alice and Bob are assumed to
be located in space-like separated regions and are unable to communicate.
In a run, Alice can measure the spin of her half of an EPR pair either along the D1 direction
or along the D2 direction. In the same run, Bob can measure the spin of his half of the same EPR
pair either along the D′1 direction or along the D
′
2 direction.
That is, in a run, a directional pair is chosen by the players that is from (D1, D
′
2), (D1, D
′
1),
(D2, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
2). An EPR experiment involves rotating a Stern-Gerlach detector along the
chosen directional pair and performing the quantum measurement. Independent of a directional
pair that is chosen by the players in a run, the outcome of the quantum measurement is either +1
or −1 along any measurement direction for both Alice and Bob.
Corresponding to this experiment, one can then obtain a set of 16 probabilities that can be
written as in Table 3 [79].
Alice’s two types
D1
+1
−1
D2
+1
−1
Bob’s two types
D′1
+1 −1
D′2
+1 −1

ε1 ε2
ε3 ε4
ε5 ε6
ε7 ε8
ε9 ε10
ε11 ε12
ε13 ε14
ε15 ε16

.
Table 3. The probabilities in the generalized EPR experiments. (13)
4.1 Probabilities in generalized EPR experiment
The elements of the probability set εj (1 ≤ j ≤ 16) are known to satisfy certain other constraints
that are described in the following. Note that when the directional pair (D1, D
′
2) is chosen for
all runs of the experiment, the only possible outcomes are (+1,+1), (+1,−1), (−1,+1), (−1,−1).
The same is true for other directional pairs (D1, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
1), (D2, D
′
2). This leads to the
normalization constraint
∑4
j=1εj = 1 =
∑8
j=5εj ,
∑12
j=9εj = 1 =
∑16
j=13εj . (14)
Also, in a particular run of the EPR experiment, the outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along the
direction D1 or direction D2) is independent of whether the direction D
′
1 or the direction D
′
2 is
chosen in that run. Similarly, the outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along D′1 or D′2) is independent
of whether the direction D1 or the direction D2 is chosen in that run. These requirements, when
translated in terms of the probability set εj are expressed as
ε1 + ε2 = ε5 + ε6, ε1 + ε3 = ε9 + ε11, ε9 + ε10 = ε13 + ε14, ε5 + ε7 = ε13 + ε15,
ε3 + ε4 = ε7 + ε8, ε11 + ε12 = ε15 + ε16, ε2 + ε4 = ε10 + ε12, ε6 + ε8 = ε14 + ε16.
(15)
A convenient solution of the system (14, 15) is reported by Cereceda [79] to be the one for
which the set of probabilities υ = {ε2, ε3, ε6, ε7, ε10, ε11, ε13, ε16} is expressed in terms of the
remaining set of probabilities µ = {ε1, ε4, ε5, ε8, ε9, ε12, ε14, ε15} that is given as
ε2 = (1 − ε1 − ε4 + ε5 − ε8 − ε9 + ε12 + ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε3 = (1 − ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15)/2,
ε6 = (1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 − ε8 − ε9 + ε12 + ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε7 = (1 − ε1 + ε4 − ε5 − ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15)/2,
ε10 = (1 − ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 − ε9 − ε12 + ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε11 = (1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 − ε9 − ε12 − ε14 + ε15)/2,
ε13 = (1 − ε1 + ε4 + ε5 − ε8 + ε9 − ε12 − ε14 − ε15)/2,
ε16 = (1 + ε1 − ε4 − ε5 + ε8 − ε9 + ε12 − ε14 − ε15)/2.
(16)
This allows us to consider the elements of the set µ as independent variables.
4.2 Social optimality with quantum probabilities
Comparing the Table 1 with the Table 3, one notices that the players’ types should correspond
to the four directions D1, D
′
1, D2, and D
′
2 along which the measurements are performed in the
EPR experiments. We thus associate Alice’s first type to the direction D1, Alice’s second type to
the direction D2, Bob’s first type to the direction D
′
1, and Bob’s second type to the direction D
′
2.
With these associations, in a run, each of the two directions D1 and D2 is chosen with probability
1
2
. Similarly, each of the two directions D′1 and D
′
2 are chosen with the probability
1
2
.
This can also be justified as within the considered game the two types of each player appear
with the probability 1
2
which is same as the probability of selecting between one of the two available
directions for each player in the generalized EPR experiments. As EPR probabilities can become
non-factorizable, it thus motivates investigating how the outcome of the Bayesian game is affected.
Consider the Table 3 where, for instance, when it is the interaction between Alice’s type
2 and Bob of type 1, and the Stern-Gerlach detectors are rotated along these directions, the
probability that both experimental outcomes are −1 is ε12 and the probability that the observer
1’s experimental outcome is +1 and observer 2’s experimental outcome is −1 is given by ε10. The
other entries in the Table 3 can similarly be explained.
Relevant to the EPR setting is the CHSH (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt) form of Bell’s in-
equality that is usually expressed in terms of the correlations 〈D1D′1〉, 〈D1D′2〉, 〈D2D′1〉, 〈D2D′2〉.
Using the Table 3 the correlation 〈D1D′1〉, for instance, can be obtained as
〈D1D′1〉 = Pr(D1 = 1, D′1 = 1)− Pr(D1 = 1, D′1 = −1)
−Pr(D1 = −1, D′1 = +1) + Pr(D1 = −1, D′1 = −1)
= ǫ1 − ǫ2 − ǫ3 + ǫ4. (17)
Expressions for the correlations 〈D1D′2〉, 〈D2D′1〉, and 〈D2D′2〉 can similarly be obtained. The
CHSH sum of correlations is given as
∆ = 〈D1D′1〉+ 〈D1D′2〉+ 〈D2D′1〉 − 〈D2D′2〉 , (18)
and the CHSH inequality stating that |∆| ≤ 2 holds for any theory of local hidden variables.
The set of constraints on probabilities ǫi that are imposed by Tsirelson’s bound [80] state
that the quantum prediction of the CHSH sum of correlations ∆, defined in (18), is bounded in
absolute value by 2
√
2 i.e. |∆QM | ≤ 2
√
2. Taking into account [79] the normalization condition
(14), the quantity ∆ can equivalently be expressed as
∆ = 2(ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ5 + ǫ8 + ǫ9 + ǫ12 + ǫ14 + ǫ15 − 2). (19)
We now refer to the payoffs given in Eqs. (4) and find that these can be expressed as
ΠA1(ǫi) =
1
2
[ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ5 + ǫ8], ΠA2(ǫi) =
1
2
[ǫ9 + ǫ12 + ǫ14 + ǫ15] ,
ΠB1(ǫi) =
1
2
[ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ9 + ǫ12] , ΠB2(ǫi) =
1
2
[ǫ5 + ǫ8 + ǫ14 + ǫ15] . (20)
Note that the payoffs (20) are reduced to the payoffs in the mixed-strategy game (3) when the
probability set εj (1 ≤ j ≤ 16) is factorizable in terms of the probabilities p, q, p′, q′ ∈ [0, 1] as
given by Eqs. (5). The sum of the players’ payoffs thus becomes
Πsum(ǫi) = ΠA1(ǫi) + ΠA2(ǫi) + ΠB1(ǫi) + ΠB2(ǫi)
= (ǫ1 + ǫ4 + ǫ5 + ǫ8 + ǫ9 + ǫ12 + ǫ14 + ǫ15) . (21)
Using Eq. (19) we, therefore, obtain
Πsum(ǫi) =
∆
2
+ 2, (22)
and, as the CHSH form of Bell’s inequality is |∆| ≤ 2, the range of values for Πsum(ǫi) when
CHSH version of Bell’s inequality holds is
2 ≤ |Πsum(ǫi)| ≤ 3. (23)
With the underlying EPR quantum probabilities, the socially optimal outcome of the game is
obtained when Πsum(ǫi) is maximized, which is now bounded in by a different absolute value i.e.
2 ≤ |Πsum(ǫi)| ≤ (2+
√
2) = 3.414. (24)
We note that this sum exceeds the sum of 5
2
for the ‘non-edge’ solution (p∗, q∗; p′∗, q′∗) = (1
2
, 1
2
; 1
4
, 1
4
)
of the socially optimal outcome in the Bayesian game with factorizable probabilities. It also exceeds
the ‘edge solution’ (p, q; p′, q′) = (0, 0; 0, 0) at which this sum is 3. However, it is less than the
other ‘edge solution’ of (p, q; p′, q′) = (1, 1; 1, 1) at which the sum is 4.
5 Discussion
We study the game-theoretic solution concept of social optimality in a Bayesian game when the
underlying probabilities are obtained from generalized EPR experiments. In a Pareto optimal
solution the players cannot change their choices so as to make one better off while leaving the
other at least as good. A socially efficient outcome is a set of choices that maximizes the sum
of the two players’ payoffs. A socially efficient outcome is always a Pareto optimum, i.e. it is
not possible to make one player better off without also making the other player worse off. Social
optimality is thus a refinement on the set of Pareto-optimal outcomes and consists of the set of
players’ strategies that maximizes the sum of their payoffs.
For generalized EPR experiments, CHSH form of Bell’s inequality can be expressed as a con-
straint on the absolute value of ∆ as defined in Eq. (19) in terms of the joint probabilities εj
(1 ≤ j ≤ 16). For the Bayesian game studied in this paper, we find that when the underlying
probabilities are obtained from generalized EPR experiments, the sum of the players’ payoffs be-
comes directly proportional to ∆. This allows us to observe the effect of violation CHSH form of
Bell’s inequality on the socially optimal outcome of the game.
We find that with the underlying probabilities being quantum mechanical, a new socially
optimal outcome is obtained for which the maximum of the sum of players’ payoffs exceeds such
maximum for factorizable probabilities while excluding the edge solutions. However, we also note
that the edge solutions for the factorizable case can still exceed the quantum non-edge solution.
Although the quantum set up is different in this paper, one might argue that the result developed
has direct parallels with the work that is reported in Ref. [44].
From the words ‘Bayesian’ and ‘quantum’ one can imply the quantum Bayesian program of
Caves, Fuchs, and Schack [81] aiming to interpret quantum probabilities as Bayesian probabilities.
In this paper, our aim, however, is different and consists of showing that Bayesian games provide
the appropriate setting where the role of quantum probabilities can be demonstrated directly and
also without recourse to the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics.
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